



Dear Delegates,

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the 2018 University of Central Punjab MUN.

The following pages intend to guide you in the research of the topics that will be debated at UCPMUN 2018 in committee sessions. Please note this guide only provides the basis for your investigation. It is your responsibility to find as much information necessary on the topics and how they relate to the country you represent. Such information should help you write your Position Paper, where you need to cite the references in the text and finally list all references in the Modern Language Association (MLA) format.

The more information and understanding you acquire on the two topics, the more you will be able to influence the Resolution writing process through debates [formal and informal caucuses], and the UCPMUN'18 experience as a whole. Please feel free to contact us if and when you face challenges in your research or formatting your Position Papers.

We encourage you to learn all you can about your topics first and then study your country with regard to the two selected topics. Please remember that both committee members need to be well versed and ready to debate both topics.

Enjoy researching and writing your Position Papers.

We look forward to seeing you at the Conference!

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Disarmament and International Security

First Committee

The First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime.

It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of

international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.

The Committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Geneva- based Conference on Disarmament. It is the only Main Committee of the General Assembly entitled to verbatim records coverage.

Source: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/>

AGENDA 1

Nuclear Disarmament (Topic Background)

The first purpose of the United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security," and there may be no greater threat to peace and security than nuclear weapons. With over 22,000 nuclear weapons in existence worldwide, there are enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world many times over. And yet, various states refuse to give up their nuclear weapons and other states seek to acquire nuclear weapons. By debating "Nuclear Disarmament," delegates will learn the various issues that make this a complex topic, including issues of disarmament, non-proliferation, and access to nuclear energy. Delegates will study the work of the General Assembly 1st Main Committee: Disarmament and International Security, the framework set by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and larger international relations themes of deterrence and the "security dilemma." Can the international community achieve a world free of nuclear weapons?

Mankind has invented few, if any, weapons as powerful and destructive as the nuclear bomb. The world saw the first use of nuclear weapons on August 6, 1945, during World War II, when American pilots dropped one atomic bomb, dubbed Little Boy, on Hiroshima, Japan. Three days later, they dropped a second one, dubbed Fat Man, on Nagasaki, Japan. Casualties range from 150,000 to 200,000. The injuries and scars of that destruction are still in evidence today, both in the memories of its victims and the cancers they have developed.

By the end of World War II, the world realized that nuclear weapons were a very dangerous thing. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty went into effect on January 1, 1967. At that time, only five countries had tested and manufactured nuclear weapons. They were United Nations Security Council permanent members: Russia, China, France, the UK, and the US. All other signatories to the NPT agreed to not pursue nuclear weaponry, instead focusing on the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Since then, other countries have sought, developed, or claimed to have developed nuclear weapons. India, Pakistan, and North Korea have developed nuclear weapons, while Israel and Iran may or may not secretly harbor nuclear devices and technology. Some countries, most of them signatory to the NPT, have possessed or technology but have since destroyed or surrendered them, such as the former Soviet Union republics Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

The original five countries initially built nuclear weaponry for a powerful offense, but many have since repurposed them for domestic defense under the concept of nuclear deterrence. Countries now recognize that any nuclear strike will leave the offending country vulnerable to a nuclear retaliation, either from the defending country or its nuclear-capable allies. The result of such an eye-for-an-eye mentality would be mutually assured destruction. To this end, countries seeking to protect themselves from aggressors began amassing nuclear weapons to deter hostile countries from attack.

It is against the interest of both nuclear-capable and non-nuclear capable countries to see nuclear weaponry spread. As these weapons become more accessible, the likelihood of MAD increases for the entire global community. The effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons is referred to as nuclear non-proliferation. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has spearheaded the movement to establish a nuclear-weapon-free.

regime and seeks to deter states and organizations that have nuclear arms or capabilities from transferring its nuclear weapons or capabilities to states or organizations that do not. To enforce and monitor the NPT, the treaty calls upon the actions of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an international agency that works primarily by inspecting nuclear facilities.

Nuclear research has also yielded a double-edged sword. Nuclear technology can be harnessed for peaceful, civilian nuclear energy. This free, cheap energy would be a boon to developing and developed countries around the world. However, the nuclear material used to create this energy can also be used to create nuclear weapons. Understandably, while some countries perceive the pursuit of nuclear energy as their sovereign right, other countries fear these nuclear power plants may instead harbor or research nuclear weaponry. To compound the issue, non-state actors, e.g. terrorists, have accelerated nuclear proliferation by covertly creating, stealing, selling, and distributing nuclear technology and weapons to nuclear-incapable parties. These goods include nuclear scientists, equipment, knowledge, or arms.

Past International Action

In 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed. It currently comprises 189 signatory countries, among them the Big Five, the collective name for the five countries that are recognized by the NPT to legally harbor nuclear weapons. Countries noticeably absent from the NPT include Pakistan, Israel, India, and Iran, which harbor, claim to harbor, or have sought to obtain nuclear weapons and technology. Also, notably absent from the NPT is North Korea, which was formerly a member but later absconded and is currently suspected of possessing or researching nuclear weapons and technology. The success of the NPT can be measured by the signatory nations that have formerly possessed nuclear weapons but have since disbanded them. These nations include South Africa and Belarus.

The NPT operates on three core concepts. Non-proliferation is the first concept. This concept states that signatory nations will take measures to prevent and stop the spread of nuclear weapons and technology from parties that have nuclear capabilities to parties that do not. This agreement goes both way: signatory parties that do not have nuclear capabilities may not obtain nuclear weapon capabilities. The second pillar is disarmament; the success of the NPT can be seen in countries that have had nuclear technology or nuclear weapons and have since disarmed themselves willingly. And the third pillar is the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Countries that wish to pursue peaceful nuclear energy and nuclear technology should be permitted to do so under their sovereign rights. However, some nations have used this mantra as a curtain under which to hide the development of nuclear weapons for non-peaceful purposes.

The watchdog of the NPT is the IAEA, or International Atomic Energy Agency, which was established independently of the UN by the IAEA Statute. The IAEA works with the General Assembly, Security Council, and signatory countries through its regular inspections program

to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and deter the military use of nuclear power. Although the IAEA works closely with the UN, the IAEA is an autonomous organization.

The IAEA operates several programs. One such program is regular inspections of nuclear facilities of signatory states to guarantee compliance with the NPT. Furthermore, the IAEA also serves as a forum for nuclear scientists to share research around the globe to further the non-military use of nuclear weapons. The IAEA offers numerous other programs and services, whose purposes range from deterring signatory states from misusing nuclear technology and materials, to developing peaceful applications for nuclear technology, to promoting nuclear safety and nuclear security standards.

The international community has taken other actions to promote non-proliferation. In 1973, the United States and the Soviet Union began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that led to a bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile Treatyⁱⁱⁱ, which limited each party to 100 anti-ballistic missiles and two anti-ballistic missile production facilities. The treaty was in force until June 2002, when the United States withdrew.

In 1993 the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) continued on the foundation that SALT built. Another bilateral agreement between Russia and the United States, the treaty put hard limits on the number of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs (An MIRV is a type of missile capable of releasing multiple warheads at multiple, independent targets, essentially allowing one missile to wipe out three or more missile silos).

In 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly. It strengthened the NPT by prohibiting the development and testing of nuclear weapons, in any environment, for either military or civilian purposes.

Also, over the past 50 years, many regions have established nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs), which prohibit all countries and territories in that zone from possessing or utilizing nuclear weapons and sometimes nuclear technology, such as nuclear power or nuclear waste. These regions notably include territories of nuclear powered states, such as the British Virgin Islands, which exists in a NWFZ and abides by its rules, even though its protectorate, the UK, is a nuclear power.

In 2004, Resolution 1540 was adopted by the United Nations Security Council. This resolution bound all member nations to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction by any means necessary. The Security Council has utilized UNCS 1540 to deter members and non-member nations from proliferation nuclear materials or using nuclear weapons. The resolution also pushed its members to prevent the unsafe distribution or acquisition of fissile materials by establish an international set of standards related to nuclear safety and security.

In 2009, Resolution 1874 was passed by the Security Council as a reaction to a nuclear test by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The resolution essentially reiterated the points of UNCS 1540, as well as urging the cooperation of the international community in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and technology, pushing for a more rigorous framework under which to test nuclear facilities for NPT compliance, and most importantly, reinforcing the solidarity of the international community in their stance against nuclear proliferation.

Possible Solutions

Delegates should approach the issue of nuclear disarmament on three grounds: nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and nuclear energy.

The issue of nuclear non-proliferation will only become more pressing as nuclear weapons become easier to manufacture, conceal, and distribute. Furthermore, while a majority of the international community is on the same page regarding nuclear non-proliferation, many hostile non-state parties are not, and these parties do not always abide by international law. Delegates should be prepared to propose solutions that would deter countries from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. These solutions must also deal with the possibilities of militant, non-member nations that possess the technology, the materiel, and the willingness to use nuclear weapons. Specifically, what measures will these solutions take to prevent the illegal distribution of nuclear weapons? What will your solution do in the case of a nuclear threat? How would these solutions be enforced? Monetary and non-monetary guarantees may or may not be effective, depending on your country's resources. Delegates should also consider bilateral, economic, or political agreements that would reign in nuclear proliferation among violating countries and violating non-state parties.

Another issue delegates must address is disarmament. The United States and Russia currently lead the world in terms of nuclear weapons available, but other nuclear-capable countries have much colder relationships. What can be done to build trust among nuclear-capable nations, and what concessions must be granted to reduce the nuclear stockpiles of these nations? Even in the event of a nuclear disarmament agreement, delegates must address how this agreement would be enforced. The IAEA can only inspect the nuclear facilities it knows about; how can countries be transparent in the disarmament process?

Finally, delegates must address the lure of nuclear energy. Nations have a right to pursue nuclear power, but solutions must be found to keep nuclear power peaceful. What guarantees can be made? Who can enforce them? When does nuclear power become a nuclear menace?

Further Research

Guiding Questions

- What further steps can the IAEA take to further guarantee that nuclear facilities are only being used for peaceful purposes?
- What systems does your country currently employ to actively discourage non-state parties from obtaining nuclear technology or weaponry?
- How can the international community enforce the NPT on non-signatory nations?
- What effect has the NPT had on your country?

Research Sources

- Nuclear Files: <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/>
- The Nuclear Threat Initiative: <http://www.nti.org/>
- UN Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA): <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/>
- Security Council Committee 1540 on the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/>
- Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament: <http://www.cnduk.org/>
- Global Policy Forum: The Security Council and Nuclear Weapons: <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/185/41129.html>
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): <http://www.iaea.org/>
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml>

AGENDA 1

PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

The right of all states to explore and use the outer space, this unique shared environment, for the benefit and in the interest of all humankind is a universally accepted legal principle. It is the concern and responsibility of all states to ensure that these rights can be exercised in the interest of maintaining international peace and security.

Introduction

The prevention of an arms race in outer space, also known as PAROS, is one of the most important issues currently under consideration. One of the reasons this issue is critical is that satellites that are sent to orbit in the space are vulnerable to damage/ destruction by almost anything even as small as space debris. This issue is also largely prevailing because of the lack of general consensus upon the nations around the globe as to which of these outer space elements should be included in the category of “space weapons”.

The issue could be divided into two major categories:

- Militarization of Outer Space
- Weaponization of Outer Space

Militarization of Outer Space: Militaries all over the world rely on satellites that have been put into the space since the earliest communication satellites were set free to orbit it. Global Positioning Systems (GPS) all over the world are used for so called “peaceful purposes” while their peacefulness remains profoundly doubtful. There are satellites which could be used for controlling bombing raids and other malicious purposes. Therefore, the issue of militarization of space is a very deep and important area for discussion to ensure the safety and security of all the nations around the globe.

Weaponization of Outer Space: Transporting potentially destructive satellite devices into the space orbit is generally referred to as Weaponization of Outer Space. Although not agreed upon largely, the weapons which use space as a medium to travel before hitting their targets such as hypersonic technology vehicles are also considered a part of weaponization of outer space. In addition, missiles which carry dual characteristics, meaning that they could destroy space assets, as well as other ballistic missiles could also be deemed part of the problem.

History

The history of space weaponization goes back to the late 1950s, when first anti-satellite systems went through tests. As yet, however, weapons have not been stationed in space. Nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are banned from space under the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which is usually called the Outer Space Treaty. The treaty barred signatories from launching into Earth’s orbit any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as banned the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies and the use of any other method to put such weapons in space. But the Outer Space Treaty mentions no restriction on conventional weapons in space.

Current Status of PAROS

PAROS is a UN resolution that reaffirms the fundamental principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and advocates on banning on the weaponization of outer space. The resolution also advocates on the need of further advancements in protecting the outer space from being weaponized. It also called upon the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to advance into further proceedings to confirm a weapon free space. In 1981, the CD led to begin talks on the issue and established an ad-hoc committee on PAROS in 1985. However, due to opposition, it was dissolved in 1994. In 2005, the UNGA adopted further measurements to ensure the solution of the PAROS issue and approved an annual resolution on “Transparency and Confidence Building Measures in Outer Space Activities”. This issue has been unsolved due to opposition by countries like the U.S who claims that there is no arms race in outer space and therefore see no need for such treaties. On the other hand, China and Russia have produced various draft treaties reiterating the need of a weapon free outer space. Some of the suggestions made by them include exchange of information.

Background Overview of the issue of PAROS

In the 21st century, the role of outer space environment has become more important than ever. Outer space resources today are utilized in all developmental aspects, ranging from weather forecasts to navigation and surveillance. Outer space activities play a vital role in social, economic, scientific and technological development all over the world. Today, there are more than 1,000 operational satellites in orbit around the Earth. More than 60 States, government consortiums and other entities own or operate those space assets and more and more States are becoming spacefaring nations and/or increasing their space-based capabilities and resources.

In the previous decades, the number of space actors and space users has increased significantly, resulting in a more clogged outer space. If this increase continues, the risk of threats to outer space objects would increase in an alarming manner, too.

PAROS and arms control in reference to nuclear disarmament

If the weaponization of space occurs in the current scenario, not only would it be extremely destructive to the strategic balance and stability of international peace, but also disrupt the existing arms control instruments. This would further force nations across the globe to take initiatives to leave other nations behind, behind thus starting an altogether never ending space race. It is evident by history that initiatives like these do nothing else than just disrupt international peace efforts. The withdrawal of the U.S from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001 and the development of US ground- and sea-based “missile defences” raised the tensions with the Russian Federation and caused an increased missile proliferation. Deploying technologies like this would result in the nuclear weapon states refusal to sign new treaties that allow for a regulation on nuclear weapon technology.

Outer Space and Missile Defence

Missile defines is a shield that has been used by various states against the threats of possible outer space missile attacks. To avoid such attacks, countries like the U.S have been focusing on developing ballistic missile defines shields. Under the impression of defines, countries may use belligerent technologies such as the Kinetic Energy Interceptors which are missiles that can destroy enemy missiles by hitting them when launched in the space. Even if used for the purpose of defines, these missile technologies may start an unstoppable and extremely destructive chain of missile attacks in the outer space. This specially poses a great threat

since the space debris which may result by this could further destroy potential civil and commercial space infrastructure like satellites.

Outer Space and Space Debris

With an increasing number of space objects, the space environment is becoming more and more congested which means there is an increased risk of collisions resulting from space debris in the outer space. With more than 5 decades of space activity, the space debris could alarmingly reach out to a point where it might not be possible to deploy space weapons around them, pushing for a need to deploy these space weapons in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). This would further worsen the situation as there will be less or even no room for satellites and other objects used for civilian purposes. According to scientists, if a space race was to start and a number of satellites were destroyed, the space debris could increase to an extent where it might be impossible to deploy new satellites from being stationed.

Current status of deployment of arms in the outer space

At present, there is no authenticated proof of any known weapons being deployed in the outer space. However, China, in the year 2007, and the U.S, in the year 2008, has successfully demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities. The U.S is also believed to have been working on the development of a ballistic missile defence shield.

Ironically, the idea of developing the missile defense itself could be an offense under the deception of defense. This evidently puts the nations across the globe to be alarmed and cultivate a possible arms race which could lead these nations to indulge in a never ending competition of equipping themselves with better, more suitable and technologically advanced space weapons to take the lead in getting full spectrum dominance over each other. Major defence contractors are actively developing their aerospace capabilities, and smaller aerospace corporations are competing to prove their technical innovation in making satellites smaller and launch vehicles less expensive. There are many reasons to be concerned about the development of missile defence and space weapon technology, including the increased conventional military dominance by the US, the vast waste of resources that accompanies any arms build-up, whether it is a race or an asymmetrical surge, and the physical results of fighting in outer space—especially space debris, which can destroy civil and commercial space infrastructure such as Satellites.

The role of existing treaties in resolving the issue According to a report of the General Assembly, the GGE “recognized that the existing treaties on outer space adopted by General Assembly especially the 1967 treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies have played an invaluable important role in consolidating a strengthened environment of international peace and security regarding the outer space. The group also recognized that there should be a continued supervision of all Space activities by all states to ensure a safe outer space for all.”

The role of international law with regards to the PAROS issue

It is a concrete reality that in order to maintain the international peace and security, abiding by international law is necessary. To ensure that, a greater international cooperation is needed where all states have to act responsibly and make intimations in a timely manner in case of any unforeseen incident regarding the safety and security of all states whenever they are carrying out any outer space activities. It is also necessary that these activities be in the best interest of all the states and not pose a threat to any nation in any possible way. In order to

prevent any mishaps, failures or security threats related to outer space activities, all states should be well aware of the international law and must adhere to the safety and security measurements that have been set by the concerned agencies or bodies. Such cooperation is needed to prevent all states from facing any possible threat related to the outer space objects.

Summary of Existing Legal Framework with years formulated regarding the PAROS issue

1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water

1967 Outer Space Treaty (formally titled as the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.)

1968 Rescue Agreement (formally titled as the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space)

1971 Agreement Relating To The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization "Intelsat" (with annexes and Operating Agreement

1972 Liability Convention (formally titled as the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects)

1975 Registration Convention (formally titled the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space)

1979 Moon Agreement (formally entitled the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies)

1985 Convention On The International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) with Annex and Operating Agreement (1976); as amended 1985; with Protocol (1981)

The existing legal framework has undoubtedly prevented the deployment of weapons and use of force or military activities in the outer space. However, as seen by some states, the scope is still limited and there yet need to be more efforts to avoid arms race in the outer space. With the new technologies in this regard, the legal framework can be strengthened to make these treaties more effective.

The role of international community in general regarding the PAROS issue

Nations across the world have been showing immense cooperation in taking steps to prevent any threats from outer space activities. The international community has taken concrete steps and advancements in making effective and fruitful initiatives and agreements for safeguarding the space environment. Various transparency and confidence building measures have been proposed and taken by a major consensus by the member states. These measures include working papers on transparency and confidence building measures in outer space, treaty proposals for the safety and security of the space and various other related proposals. In June 2012, the European Union presented a draft of a non-legally binding international code of conduct for outer space activities to the international community in Vienna followed by open ended consultations in Kyiv in May 2013. A large number of UN member states are of the opinion that a multilateral treaty is the only solution to prevent an arms race in outer space. In 2006, the Russian Federation insisted on prohibition of weaponization and the Russian Federation, along with the People's Republic of China, has been strongly supporting

the prohibition of use or threat of use of force against space objects. On the other hand, “The United States systematically argues that an arms race in outer space does not yet exist, and it is therefore unnecessary to take action on the issue. The rest of the international community agrees that, because there is not yet an arms race, now is the time to prevent weaponization of space.” Many member states have now developed policies that prevent them from being the “first” state to put weapons (any objects possessing destructive capacity) in the outer space.

Bloc Positions

The majority of UN states are concerned that the weaponization of space will lead to an arms race, indeed they also believe that a multilateral treaty is the only way to prevent such an arms race. This treaty should not limit space access but would prevent the deployment of weapons in space. The General Assembly each year a resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space is introduced and adopted by an overwhelming majority of member states. As a matter of fact, every country in the world votes in favour of the PAROS treaty, except the United States and Israel - which abstain.

Possible Solutions

Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space (TCBMs)

In 2007, the UN Secretary-General issued a report compiling the views of member states on the issue of TCMBs in outer space, as requested by a General Assembly resolution.²⁸ The report was issued in two parts: A/62/11429 and A/62/114/Add.1.

Prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space (PPWT) PPWT 31 is a joint Russia-China draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects. The draft treaty was presented by The Russian Federation’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov on February 12, 2008. The draft treaty is the only treaty by that has been formally introduced to the CD. According to Minister Lavrov, the draft treaty is designed to “eliminate existing lacunas in international space law, create conditions for further exploration and use of space, preserve costly space property, and strengthen general security and arms control.”

Overview of the draft treaty

- Both 2002 paper and 2008 draft emphasize the need of a “military confrontation” free outer space
- The existing arms control and disarmament agreements play a positive role but are insufficient to address the issue of disarmament
- Further measures must be taken to prevent the placement of weapons in the outer space
- The draft explains the terms “outer space,” “outer space objects,” and “weapons in outer space.” e The draft calls for the state parties not to place any weapons in the outer space, not to install any weapons on celestial bodies, not to use or threaten to use any kind of force against outer space objects
- The draft further calls upon the member states to use the outer space Strictly for peaceful purposes and follow the guidelines under the international law

- The draft also calls upon establishment of an executive organization which shall regulate additional protocols needed and record complaints against treaty violations and take measures to prevent violation of the treaties.

Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)

The GGE is a small group comprised of international space experts from space faring states. The main objective of the GGE is to make possible an atmosphere of international cooperation to solve the issue of PAROS and to reduce the possibility of misunderstandings or miscommunication regarding activities in the outer space. The GGE was supposed to carry out investigations and observations and prepare a report making conclusions and recommendations on the current developments of the issue of PAROS. The first GGE was formed in 2004 comprising of 15 members but could not prepare a substantive report. The second GG was formed in 2009 comprising of 15 members and successfully concluded a report.

Following were the recommendations made in this report:

- Dialogue on norms for state use of information and communications technologies (ICTs), to reduce risk and protect critical infrastructures
- Confidence-building and risk reduction measures, including discussion of ICTs in conflict
- Information exchanges on national legislation and national ICT security strategies, policies and technologies
- Capacity-building in less developed countries
- The elaboration of common terms and definitions on Information Security. The General Assembly in 2011 unanimously approved a resolution (66/24) calling for the formation of the last (third) GGE. The first meeting of GGE took place in New York in August 2012; the second took place in Geneva in January 2013, and the last in June of 2013 in New York. The GGE concluded its work on 16 July 2013

International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC) was initiated by the European Union in 2008. The primary function of the code was to formulate a set of principles and guidelines agreed upon by the states on a voluntary basis. It was also decided that the code will not have any authoritative or enforcement mechanism. The two major reasons behind this idea were the development and implementation of transparency and confidence building measures. The three main principles of the ICoC are:

- A right of all countries to use the outer space for peaceful purposes
- Protection of security and reliability of soace objects in orbit
- Consideration for states' legitimate defense interests

ICoC was formulated to be applicable to all outer state activities including states, corporations, universities and others. The code was intended to address the safety and sustainability of space environment as well as stability and security in outer space. Since it addresses both of the above mentioned aspects, it was decided that the ICoC will also include those member states that are not members of the CD or COPUOS. The main purpose of

formulating the ICoC was not to contradict any on-going discussions, but to “find an agreement on a text that is acceptable to all interested States and that thus brings effective security benefits in a relatively short term.”

Support from the international community

- The ICoC has been endorsed by Australia, Canada and Japan
- Brazil, Russia, India and China on the other hand have shown disappointment based on the fact that they were not consulted properly in this development.
- Some countries have reservations, especially those with little presence in space, that the ICoC could play a role in limiting their future capacities in carrying out space activities
- India has raised concern that the code will not be effective without legally binding obligations
- The United States, having had a national debate about this issue, endorsed the ICoC
- Some countries have raised concerns that the ICoC may be interfering with some of the countries’ domestic policy making
- Despite disagreements or reservations, the code has also received positive endorsement since it deals with both environmental protection as well as arms control
- The first consultations in Kiev in May 2013 turned out to be the first multilateral meetings held and the EU announced that it would include all the participating nations’ concerns while incorporating views in the code
- The second consultations that took place in Bangkok in 2013 focused on the “body” of the proposed text and the EU announced that a revised draft would be presented in early 2014 and that one more consultation meeting might be necessary before concluding the ICoC initiative in 2014.

Questions that a Resolution Must Answer

This is the most important part of the study guide. It will facilitate the process of your writing your resolutions. In this section, the basic and most crucial parts that your resolution must tackle will be delineated. Remember that though not obligatory, following the directions provided will ensure the putting together of a solid and considerably ample resolution, which is the first step to a good Committee Session, and subsequently, to a good MUN. The basic information that your resolution must adhere to, is the following:

- **Definitions:** As everything in space can constitute grave danger, i.e. it only takes a small rock to destroy a satellite of incalculable cost, it is crucial that you define or at least outline what constitutes weaponization of outer space. Definitions are a key part of the MUN as a whole. It is how you will define the topic that will define the lobbying, the debate and eventually the final resolution. What is more, you can consult the working paper issued by China and Russia, where definitions are discussed upon vital topics, such as Outer Space, Space Weapons, etc. (You will find a citation to this working paper later on)

- Another issue that should be tackled is the use of space. As you have figured out through your individual research, it all eventually boils down to why or why not should outer space be used as an environment free from weapons, and all activities conducted in it should have a benign and peaceful nature or purpose. For a more comprehensive analysis of the use of space, I would recommend the following form of categorization: Military Use Scientific Use Commercial Use This form of categorization would facilitate the assembling your information, and would create a more lucid and pertinent resolution. Be cognizant of the fact that the more analytical and thorough your resolution is, and the more you analyze the topic and break it down, the better results it will produce. * Suggest realistic and manageable ways to implement the changes you suggest. Do not forget that everything that is suggested ought to be substantiated through realistic ways of implementation. When you propose a means of solving a particular issue, or when you propose, for instance, the establishment of a committee, you need to clearly elucidate upon this. The more thorough your resolution is, the more effective your points will be.
- A sufficiently researched and well-prepared resolution has to refer to what could the possible effects of weaponization of outer space be, and correlate them to the main concept of prevention of an arms race in outer space. A brief Summary of historical examples or other situations which resemble this one can further consolidate the points made and establish the foundations of a good resolution.
- Lastly, the role of the current Commissions or Treaties established and their part in current affairs should be asserted. You must also draw a line between the proposals you make and the role of the current instruments. More specifically, by connecting the current situation as a whole to the prospective future situation, the resolution acquires a case line and increases in strength of evidence. Hence, the brief list of questions that is established and should be answered by a precise and concise resolution is the following:

For countries opposing PAROS

- Potential Preambulatory Clauses
- What is defined as arms race?
- What are its potential effects?
- Through which evidence can we draw information about the effects of arms race?
- What do we define as outer space?
- What can be characterized as a Space weapon and what is its value?
- What can be inferred from previous conferences and treaties about outer space, and to what extent does it apply to the contemporary society?
- Why is it important that outer space is weaponized?
- What would the beneficial effect be on the global community? Potential Operative Clauses
- How can prevention a failure?

- What ways are there in order to implement weaponization of outer space and why does this not constitute a danger, based on the use of weapons?
- How will they be financed? For countries supporting PAROS

Potential Preambulatory Clauses

- What is defined as arms race?
- What are its potential effects?
- Through which evidence can we draw information about the effects of arms race?
- What do we define as outer space?
- What can be characterized as a space weapon and what is its limitation?
- What can be inferred from previous conferences and treaties about outer space, and to what extent does it apply to the contemporary society?
- Why is it important that outer space is safeguarded from weaponization?
- What would the detrimental effect be on the global community? Potential Operative Clauses
- How can prevention a success?
- What ways are there in order to implement the safeguarding of outer space and why does not doing so constitute a danger, based on the use of weapons?
- How will the monitoring of space or any other measure proposed, be financed?

For countries with a neutral stance about PAROS

Potential Preambulatory Clauses

- What is defined as arms race?
- What are its potential effects?
- Through which evidence can we draw information about the effects of arms race?
- What do we define as outer space?
- What can be characterized as a space weapon and what is its limitation and value?
- What can be inferred from previous conferences and treaties about outer space, and to what extent does it apply to the contemporary society?
- What are the main points about outer space that ought to be safeguarded, if any?
- What would the overall effect be on the global community? Potential Operative Clauses
- What could be the potential culminations of PAROS?

- To what extent will monitoring activity in space, if any required, be limiting spatial activity?
- How will the monitoring of space or any other measure proposed, be financed? The main issue is that everything that is stated in your preambulatory clauses ought to be substantiated or tackled in the operative clauses. Remember that the preamble talks about the situation and the operative clauses specifically suggest what to do about the situation. All of your actions ought to be stated in the operative clauses, and there should be a lucid connection between your preamble and your operative clauses. Self-explanatorily, these questions will comprise the main body of your resolutions. However, you should not hesitate to add to what has been said and integrate parts of